Slaughter of the Innocents

25 March 2001 

Introduction 

The current policy of extending the animal slaughter to include all those within 3km of infected sites is one approaching insanity. It is economically damaging, devastating to the farmers involved and, ultimately, self-defeating. It is based on poor science, tainted with more than a whiff of political opportunism and wholly unnecessary. Targeted, emergency vaccination is a much better and considerably less damaging option. Change to a targeted vaccination policy is urgently necessary. In this paper, these issues are explored. 

Background 

Recently, it was revealed that Mr Hugues Inizan, a French stock dealer operating out of the UK, had sent sheep to France on the 31 January, already infected with foot and mouth disease. This has profound implications for our understanding of the dynamics of the current epidemic and for its management and control. 

This strongly indicates that the start of the epidemic was earlier than has been indicated by the Ministry of Agriculture, which identified disease in a pig unit at Heddon-on-the-Wall, Northumberland, on 22 February. Yet the Ministry is only prepared to concede that the infection may have been present two weeks previously, i.e., 8 February or thereabouts. 

However, Inizan's sheep had come from several isolated farms local to Lyswen on the Brecon beacons, and clearly had no contact with the pigs at Heddon-on-the-Wall. The most likely contacts were with other sheep in the collection centre before despatch, or on the ferry to France. 

For the disease to have spread to Inizan's sheep, those sheep themselves must have been infected, which takes time - the so-called incubation period. The "official" incubation period is taken as 14 days (for the purposes of the OIE Code) with an average of 3-8 days, although the virus can be shed before clinical signs develop. Taking the average incubation period, this means that the animals which infected Inizan's sheep were most probably exposed to infection between 3-8 days prior to contact - i.e., between 23-28 Jan. 

It has been fairly well established that none of those sheep came directly from Heddon-on-the Wall so they cannot have been infected by the "case zero" pigs. There must have been at least one other set of animals which bridged the gap between Heddon and those on the ferry to France. 

This extends the time-frame for the epidemic, pushing back the date of acquisition of the infection by primary contacts from the Heddon pigs to a period between 15-25 January. For the pigs themselves to pass on the infection to these animals, they must have been infected earlier, between 7-22 January, on the basis that the minimum plausible chain for spreading the disease from Heddon-on-the-Wall is: Pigs (Heddon) > Sheep (Heddon) > Sheep (?) > Sheep (Inizan). The latest time for disease to be visible in the pig unit is 25th January. 

Crucially, however, it is known that a detailed veterinary inspection was made of the Heddon-on-the-Wall unit on 25th January. No signs of the disease were noted. It is possible that the signs could have been missed. But they were noted when the unit was again inspected on 22nd February and the veterinary authorities are willing only to concede, from an evaluation of the condition of the pigs, that infection was present perhaps two weeks earlier. 

That signs were not visible on 25th January strongly suggests that they were not there to see. That the stage of the disease reported on 22nd February was not consistent with infection having been acquired on 22nd January again strongly suggests that the infection was not there on the 25th January. 

Heddon-on-the-Wall cannot have been "case zero". 

Inizan's evidence, therefore, is an extremely powerful indicator of two things. Firstly, the current epidemic started not in early February, as is officially held, but - at the very latest - in mid-late January and possibly mid-February or earlier. Secondly, and incidentally, Heddon-on-the-Wall cannot have been the source of the disease, leaving the more plausible scenario that the pigs picked up their infection from sheep. 

Policy considerations 

The implications of the Inizan findings are indeed profound, and demonstrate with absolute certainty that the current epidemic was well advanced before even it was detected by the Ministry. 

The significance of this is that the current control policy cannot work. It is based on three principles: early identification, isolation and slaughter, all in an attempt to eradicate the disease before it spreads. Logically, and essentially, the success of this policy depends of the identification of the disease before it has spread widely into the animal population. If the disease has already spread widely, and/or if not all the pockets of infection are known, this calls into question the whole basis of the policy. 

In fact, owing to the fact that the disease started a month before its official detection and the sheer scale of movements, both legal and illegal, the epidemic was already out of control before the Ministry counter-measures were started. That is evidenced by the large number of cases reported, their wide geographical spread, and the multi-species distribution. 

Epidemic dynamics 

Given that this is the case, it is now urgently necessary to re-examine the basis of the current control policy. Basically, the epidemic has passed into the second of three phases. Phase one involved the occurrence of outbreaks in one region, geographically confined, with little or no secondary spread. In this phase, a policy of "isolate and destroy" would have been perfectly valid. 

In the second phase, with massive secondary infection having occurred, "isolate and destroy" becomes wholly inappropriate. The priority becomes to prevent development to a third and wholly more damaging third phase. 

Phase three is where the disease breaks out and becomes completely uncontained, affecting all species: pigs, cattle and sheep. While the disease is at the moment largely (but not entirely) confined to sheep, with winter-housed cattle being largely protected, from two weeks and progressively onwards, cattle will be turned out to grazing. They will then become highly vulnerable to the disease. There is, therefore, a danger of tertiary spread to these animals, leading to an explosive, tertiary epidemic, larger than so far experienced. 

The current policy is self-defeating 

In terms of control policies, it is very clear that, while we are in a phase two situation, the government is still in the main adopting a phase one control policy. If this continues, the only response can be to widen the control areas and slaughter more and more animals. This is now being adopted, without there being an admission that we are in phase two. It is a wholly inappropriate response. 

The policy is likely to be self-defeating on two grounds. Firstly, as the reservoir of infection grows, and the control areas expand, the sheer scale of the slaughter will outstrip the resources available to deal with it. 
There is very good evidence that this is already the case. 

Secondly, the whole basis of the eradication policy is economic - its aim is to restore disease-free status in order to protect our export trade, and to prevent loss in productivity arising from the disease. However, export trade is worth only £1.2 billion per annum, whereas, since 19th February, the epidemic has cost over £9bn, with costs escalating every day. The economic cut-off has already been reached. 

New Priorities 

Recognising that we are in phase two of the epidemic, the priority must be to prevent development to phase three. Immediate eradication of the disease, at a speed sufficient to prevent break-out into phase three is not possible. Thus, "plan A" - ever-escalating slaughter - must be abandoned if we are to avoid Armageddon. We must have a "plan B". 

As to this alternative, various estimates indicated that - in the major sheep-rearing areas - infection rates are up to 80 percent. Most of these animals have already had the disease - which is relatively mild in sheep - and a level of herd immunity has been built up. Slaughter of these animals, far from assisting control, will in fact aid spread by reducing "herd immunity" thereby leaving unprotected animals more vulnerable. Therefore, the obvious policy here is to abandon sheep slaughter - except in individual cases on welfare grounds, where animals are in distress. 

So far, except in the early stages of the epidemic, there was little involvement of pigs and, since most pigs are intensively reared, they are largely protected. Therefore, the obvious strategy here is to maintain biosecurity and to kill out only where disease strikes. 

For cattle, the situation is different. Here, with limited numbers - compared with sheep and cattle - there should be a rapid vaccination programme in infected areas, to "dampen down" the infection and to protect vulnerable animals. 

Where outbreaks occur, whole herd slaughter policy should continue, but with an option for isolation and selective culling on welfare grounds, leaving survivors with acquired immunity. There is then some value in "ring-fencing" infected areas with a band of vaccination of all species, where blood testing reveals no acquired immunity. But the main emphasis should be on dampening down the disease in already infected areas, protecting the valuable stock. 

Let nature take its course 

Of the various projections as to the course of the epidemic, released over the last few days, there appears to be a central flaw. These projections are based on the official reports of confirmed disease, which are assumed to be a reflection of the course of the disease through the animal population. 

Given that the infection is widespread, reported incidence will depend on the resources applied to detection and diagnosis. Since resources have increased substantially, from 200 vets initially available to over a 1000, the reported increase in incidence could actually be a reflection of the increased resource applied, and not the actual increase in the disease. In other words, the reporting and the disease could be (and most probably are) independent variables. 

Since the disease is already widespread in sheep - and many animals have already had the disease and recovered - there will be relatively few new outbreaks (as opposed to older outbreaks newly discovered) in sheep. In this population, we may already be past the worse and the epidemic could be on the wane, even though reports are increasing. 

The key, in any event, is to let nature take its course in the sheep population and target the vulnerable, high-value species - i.e., the cattle. Emergency vaccination should start on cattle in the south and progress northwards, aiming to treat them before they are turned out to grass. 

Given a rise in naturally acquired immunity in the sheep population - through exposure to the disease - and artificially acquired immunity from vaccination in cattle, overall "herd immunity" will then arise to a level where the epidemic will peter out. We will be left with a rump of sporadic cases. These can be dealt with through culling, slaughter for food production and natural mortality, allowing the disease to die out naturally. 

There is no doubt that this strategy would enable the countryside to return to normality very rapidly, and reduce substantially the economic losses. There is no justification for the extension or continuation of mass slaughter. This is the route to disaster. 

Richard North PhD 

ends 

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